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NOT ES
Betting Against the House (and Senate): The Case
for Legal, State-Sponsored Sports Wagering in a
Post-PASPA World
Anthony G. Galasso, Jr'
INTRODUCTION
A MERICAN jurisprudence has evolved to expunge the idea that 
it is
permissible to treatsimilarlysituated individuals differently based solely
on one's status. Yet, this kind of discrimination still exists among states. For
example, Delaware and New Jersey are similar in many ways: both states are
geographically located near one another; both states offer state-sanctioned
gaming in the forms of pari-mutuel wagering on horse races and casino
gambling;2 and in 2009, both states experienced revenue shortfalls which
led to budget crises.' This prompted both states to consider an expansion
of gaming within their borders to include wagering on sporting events.'
Despite the similarities between the two states and their shared history
of gaming ventures and direct competition with one another for gamblers'
business, they receive unequal treatment under the law: federal law
permits Delaware to sanction sports wagering, but forbids New Jersey.
The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act' (PASPA or the
"Act") prohibits states from enacting, licensing, or operating any kind of
wagering scheme on sporting events.' However, the law carves out an
exception for states that operated some form of sports wagering scheme
between 1976 and 1990.1 Though not specifically named in the Act,
i JD expected 201 1, University of Kentucky College of Law: BA 2007,summa cum laude,
University of Richmond. The author wishes to thank Laura D'Angelo and Dan W\axman for
their invaluable assistance in ensuring the quality and accuracy of this Note.
2 See Wayne Parry, Delaware's Expanded Gambling Worries Atlantic City, NJ.Cosi (June 7,
2oo9), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2o09/o6/delawares-expanded-gambling-wo.htm.
3 Chris Megerian, Del. Suffers Sports Betting Loss, but NJ. Bid Still Alive: At Issue is a
Federal Ban on Single-Game Wagering, THE STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Aug. 25, 2oog, at 3;
Charles W. Kim, Betting Suit Could Mean Major NJ Sports Loss, DicirAL JOURNAL (June I I,
2009), http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/274o26.
4 Kim, supra note 3; Megerian, supra note 3.
5 Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. H§ 3701-3704 (2oo6).
6 Id. § 3702.
7 Id. § 3704.
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Nevada, Oregon, Montana, and Delaware are the only states that enjoy
this exception.' Because New Jersey failed to establish any sports wagering
scheme during the specified period, PASPA prevents New Jersey from
establishing any such scheme today.' New Jersey's casino gaming industry
has already experienced large declines in revenue caused in part by the recent
expansion of casino-style wagering into nearby states.o This expansion has
caused New Jersey to lose its status as the exclusive home of casino gaming
on the East Coast. With the threat of the introduction of sports wagering
into Delaware and the federal prohibition on New Jersey acting similarly,
New Jersey's gaming industry may be at a severe competitive disadvantage.
To combat this unequal treatment and to enable the New Jersey gaming
industry to remain competitive, New Jersey State Senator Raymond Lesniak,
joined by the Interactive Media Entertainment and Gaming Association
("iMEGA") and three New Jersey horse racing groups, filed a lawsuit in
federal court seeking to overturn PASPA "on the grounds it unconstitutionally
regulates commerce and discriminates against New Jersey and the 45 other
states where wagering on sports is illegal."" This Note will address the
issues raised in the Lesniak/iMEGA lawsuit, focusing on whether the
discrimination among states created by PASPA is indeed unconstitutional
and under what theory a challenge to the statute could proceed.
Additionally, this Note will address the underlying question that
follows from the constitutional analysis: even if PASPA could be
challenged constitutionally, should it actually be overturned? At the core
of the discussion is this question: Do the pecuniary interests of the states
outweigh the desire to protect the integrity of professional and amateur
sports in the United States-Congress' stated goal in enacting PASPA.' 2
8 "In Nevada, sports wagering is permitted in licensed commercial casinos and gaming
establishments." Michael Levinson, A Sure Bet: Why New Jersey Would Benefit from Legalized
Sports Wagering, 13 SPORTS LAW. J. 143, 146 (2oo6). Oregon operated a sports wagering lottery
focused on the outcome of National Football League games until the legislature moved to
end it in 2005. Id. at 145-46. Montana operates sports betting pools where the winner is de-
termined by the performance of individual football players in games or professional stock car
drivers in races. How to Play, MONTANA SPORTs ACTION, http://www.montanasportsaction.com/
footballhowtoplay.xsp (last visited Aug. 28, 20i0). Delaware offered a sports lottery predi-
cated on the outcome of NFL games for a single year, 1976, before attempting to legalize
sports wagering again in 2009. Office of the Comm'r of Baseball v. Markell, 579 F3 d 293,
295-96 (3d Cir. 2009).
9 -See 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a)(3). A loophole in PASPA would have allowed New Jersey to
implement a sports-wagering scheme within one year of the Act's effective date because it
was a state that had casino gaming in the ten years prior to the Act. Levinson, supra note 8,
at 149. The Legislature failed to pass legislation creating a sports wagering scheme, and the
window offered by PASPA closed for good. Id.
io Chris Herring, Neighbors Raise Stakes on Air Jersey, WALL ST. J., June 2 1, 20Io, at A26.
II Rudy Larini, Legislator Fights Ban on Sports Betting: Lesniak Sees $iooAI a Year in Tax
Revenue, THE STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Mar. 24, 2oo9, at II.
12 S. REP. No. 102-248, at 4 (1992).
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To address these questions, this Note divides the inquiry into three parts.
Part I examines PASPA to understand why it was enacted and what its effects
have been on legalized sports wagering. The legislative history surrounding
the Act is examined to determine what policy goals led to its enactment and
how and why it discriminates among states. Further, this Part analyzes the
impact of this discrimination on state-sponsored wagering throughout the
country and concludes that the effects of PASPA have extended far beyond
its stated purpose of protecting the integrity of athletic competitions.
Part II describes the availability of constitutional challenges to PASPA.
This includes a look at the issues raised at the time of the Act's passing, as
well as the specific claims alleged in the Lesniak/iMEGA complaint. This
Part presents the most compelling arguments for overturning PASPA: (1)
PASPA violates the Tenth Amendment, (2) PASPA violates the Eleventh
Amendment, and (3) PASPA is an abuse of the power granted to Congress
under the Commerce Clause due to its explicit discrimination among the
states.
Part III details why overturning PASPA should be pursued despite
its poor chances of success in the courts. To do so, this Part weighs the
competing policy interests that are implicated by the sports wagering
discussion. The potential economic benefits of legalization are weighed
against protecting the integrity of professional and amateur sports. Despite
what proponents of PASPA argued in favor of its passing in 1990, and
continue to argue now, legal sports wagering offers not only economic
benefits, but also a regulatory scheme that would achieve PASPA's goals
better than the Act itself. This Part also examines the benefits New Jersey
expects to obtain from sports wagering, including providing an economic
boost to its horse racing industry and incentives that may lure gamblers
away from internet wagering. This Note also discusses how these same
benefits may be achieved in states like Kentucky. Part IV presents the
conclusion that the benefits of legalized, state-sponsored sports wagering
far outweigh the benefits of prohibition. The policies behind the law need
to be reexamined because a law that serves a limited, abstract purpose and
has manifested harmful effects should not be unassailable. In conclusion,
PASPA is preventing state-sponsored initiatives that will not only provide
great economic benefit, but will more capably serve the purposes of PASPA.
I. PASPA: PURPOSES AND EFFECTS, INTENTIONAL AND UNINTENTIONAL
According to the Judiciary Committee's report recommending the
passage of PASPA, the Act's express purpose is "to prohibit sports gambling
conducted byor authorized under the law of, any State or other governmental
entity."' 3 A large portion of the rest of the report is devoted to outlining
13 Id. at 3
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why this is such a priority for Congress. According to the report, PASPA
"serves an important public purpose, to stop the spread of State-sponsored
sports gambling and to maintain the integrity of our national pastime."14
The threat of expanding sports wagering is "chang[ing] the nature of
sporting events from wholesome entertainment for all ages to devices for
gambling," thereby "undermin[ing] public confidence in the character of
professional and amateur sports," as well as "promotling] gambling among
our Nation's young people."' 5 Above all, the bill "represents a judgment that
sports gambling ... is a problem of legitimate Federal concern for which a
Federal solution is warranted."'" "We must do everything we can to keep
sports clean so that the fans, and especially young people, can continue to
have complete confidence in the honesty of the players and the contests.""
The report goes on to explain that this need to protect the integrity of
professional and amateur sports outweighs the potential economic benefit
legalized sports wagering offers to cash-strapped states. Specifically, the
report states that
[t]he answer to State budgetary problems should not be to increase the
number of lottery players or sports bettors, regardless of the worthiness of
the cause . . . . [T)he risk to the reputation of one of our Nation's most
popular pastimes, professional and amateur sporting events, is not worth
it18
At the time PASPA was being considered in Congress, as many as thirteen
states were considering the possibility of enacting legislation allowing
sports betting within their borders as "a panacea to their mounting
deficits."" Nevertheless, proponents of the Act, such as Senator Bill
Bradley of New Jersey, believed that "the harm that state-sponsored sports
betting causes"-that is, threatening the integrity of sports in the eyes
of both fans and young people-"far outweighs the financial advantages
received."2 0 The very premise of PASPA, according to Senator Bradley,
was "that the revenue earned by the states through sports gambling is not
enough to justify the waste and destruction attendant to the practice. Just
as legalizing drugs would lead to increased drug addition [sic], legalizing
sports gambling would aggravate the problems associated with gambling."'
PASPA sought to accomplish these goals by making it illegal for any
14 Id. at 4.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 6-7.
17 Id. at 6.
18 [d at 7.
i9 Bill Bradley, The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act-Policy Concerns Behind
Senate Bill474, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 5, 8 (1992).
2o Id.
21 Idat6.
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"governmental entity" to run any kind of wagering scheme based on the
outcome of sporting events.22 Any violation of the Act can be enjoined by
a civil action filed either "by the Attorney General of the United States,
or by a professional sports organization or amateur sports organization
whose competitive game is alleged to be the basis of such violation."2 3 The
final provision of PASPA states that the prohibition does not apply to any
wagering scheme that existed between 1976 and 1991 or "pari-mutuel
animal racing or jai-alai games." 2 Section 3704 of PASPA has proven to
be the most controversial as it effectively forbids state-sponsored sports
wagering in every state except Nevada, Oregon, Montana, and Delaware.2 1
PASPA also contained a loophole allowing states that had legal, state-
sponsored casino gaming within ten years prior to the Act's effective date
to establish a state-sponsored sports wagering scheme; however, it only
gave such states one year from the effective date of the Act to do so. 6
It is difficult to understand why an exception was carved out for
these states if sports wagering is indeed as dangerous as the majority
of Congress believed. An attempted explanation was provided in the
Judiciary Committee report. While reiterating that "all ... sports gambling
is harmful," the report expressed "no wish to apply this new prohibition
retroactively to Oregon or Delaware, which instituted sports lotteries prior
to the introduction of our legislation," or "to threaten the economy of
Nevada, which over many decades has come to depend on legalized private
gambling, including sports gambling, as an essential industry . . . ."" Thus
PASPA, as explained by the Judiciary Committee, was designed to curtail the
proliferation of sports wagering, not to eradicate it from the nation entirely.
In the eighteen years since the passage of PASPA, the Act's overall effect
has been to help Nevada develop a monopoly on sports wagering.The reason
for this is not only that PASPA discriminates between the four exempted
states and the rest of the Union, but it also discriminates among the four
exempted states as well. This was made clear in 2009 when Delaware passed
an act that authorized single-game, head-to-head wagers in addition to
"multi-game parlay" wagers.2 1 Major League Baseball (MLB), the National
22 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2oo6).
23 Id. § 3703-
24 Id. § 3704(a)(4).
25 See id.
26 Id. § 3704(a)(3). This would have allowed New Jersey to institute a legal sports wager-
ing scheme, but the Legislature voted against this option. Levinson, supra note 8, at 149-50.
This in effect creates a third level of discrimination, between exempted casino states (which
only had one year of exemption) and exempted sports wagering states (which had a general,
permanent exemption). The other two levels of discrimination are the ones discussed in this
Note: between exempted states and non-exempted states, and among the exempted sports
wagering states.
27 S. REP. No. 102-248, at 8 (1992).
28 Office of the Comm'r of Baseball v. Markell, 579 E3d 293, 295-96 (3d Cir. 2009).
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Basketball Association (NBA), the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA), the National Football League (NFL), and the National Hockey
League (NHL) collectively soughtan injunction to prevent implementation
of any wagering scheme that would include betting beyond parlay wagering
on NFL games." The district court denied the injunction, but the Third
Circuit reversed in Office of the Commissioner of Baseball v. Markell." The
court's rationale was that PASPA allowed for sports wagering only "'to the
extent the scheme was conducted' in the past. Hence, Delaware was
limited to offering sports wagering to the extent it did in 1976." Because
the 1976 sports lottery was confined to parlay wagering on NFL games, any
sports wagering Delaware offers post-PASPA must be similarly restricted.
Because Nevada offered types of wagering in the past that other
states did not, the Markell decision enables Nevada to receive millions
of dollars in revenue that is unavailable to any other state. As reported in
an article published in 2006, $2.5 billion are wagered annually in licensed
sports books in Nevada, which results in $120 million in net revenue for
casinos each year. 2 In addition, "one-third of sports wagers in Nevada are
on collegiate sporting events,"3 3 and "Nevada is the only state in which
gambling on collegiate sporting events is currently legal."' In light of the
Markell decision, Nevada is the only state where wagering on collegiate
sports could ever be legal because the other three exempted states would
be limited to offering wagering to the extent they have in the past: multi-
game wagers on NFL contests. This represents millions of dollars made
exclusive property of Nevada by the terms of PASPA that financially-
starved states cannot access, even if they are among the few exempted.
Another effect of PASPA is the increased power it gives to sports
organizations to affect state gaming policies. The NCAA already wields
great influence over state gaming policy, even beyond the terms of
PASPA. For instance, the NCAA refused to hold any men's college
basketball tournament games in Oregon because of Oregon's sports
lottery, notwithstanding the fact that the state never offered wagering
on NCAA games (nor could it in light of the Markell court's reading of
PASPA)." In response to the NCAAs decision, Oregon passed legislation
in 2005 to eliminate its sports lottery at the end of 2007.6 In its final
29 Id. at 293.
30 Id. at 304.
31 Id. at 303 (quoting 28 U.S.C. 340 l(a)(i) (2oo6)).
32 Levinson, supra note 8, at 144, 146.
33 Id. at 147-
34 Aaron J. Slavin, The "Las Vegas Loophole" and the Current Push in Congress Towards a
Blanket Prohibition on Collegiate Sports Gambling, 10 U. MIAI Bus. L. REV. 715, 720 (2002).
35 Levinson, supra note 8, at 146; Markell, 579 E3d at 295.
36 Aaron Fentress & Helen Jung, Alarch Madness Returning to Portland, THE OREGONIAN
(Portland, Or.), July 7, 2oo6, at AI.
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year of existence, the Oregon sports lottery generated record sales of
$12.7 million; the sports lottery was able to provide funding to Oregon
schools in amounts ranging from less than $1 million to $2.9 million.37
In light of the power granted in PASPA for sports organizations to
bring civil actions seeking injunctions, sports organizations now have
direct power to influence state gaming policies. The Marke// decision is a
prime example of such power: four major professional sports organizations
and the NCAA banded together to defeat a wagering scheme that was
proposed by the Governor of Delaware, approved by an advisory opinion
of the Delaware Supreme Court, and passed by the state legislature."
PASPA, in its eighteen years of existence, has proven effective in
preventing the expansion of sports wagering in the United States;
whether it has achieved its stated goal of protecting the integrity of
professional and amateur sports is debatable. PASPA has also successfully
managed to funnel virtually all legal, state-sponsored sports wagering
in the country into one state at the expense of all the others due
to judicial interpretations of the Act. This is a tragic consequence
neither the Judiciary Committee nor Senator Bradley anticipated.
II. CHALLENGING PASPA: THREE THEORIES
After examining the effects of PASPA on state economies (both those
included and excluded from its provisions), one may conclude that its
effects are unequal and that the Act is unfair. However, overturning
PASPA will require more than proof of inequality or unfairness. Opponents
of the law will only be able to overturn PASPA if they can prove that it
is unconstitutional. Senator Lesniak, iMEGA, and three horse racing
organizations allege nine violations of their constitutional rights in their
complaint ("Lesniak/iMEGA complaint").3 1 Of the nine, this Note will
focus on the three most significant theories: (1) PASPA violates the Tenth
Amendment,40 (2) PASPA violates the Eleventh Amendment,4 1 and (3)
PASPA violates the Commerce Clause due to blatant discrimination
between the states.42
37 Kevin Hays, Oregon Says Goodbye to Betting on NFL Games, SALEM-NEWS.COMi (Feb. 4,
2007), http://www.salem-news.com/articles/februaryo42oo7/oregonnflbetting-oo4o7.php.
38 ilarkell, 579 E3 d at 295.
39 Complaint and Demand for Declaratory Relief at 18-36, Interactive Media Entm't
& Gaming Ass'n, Inc. v. Holder, No. 3 :o 9-<v-o30i-GEB-TJB (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2009), 2009
WL 4890878.
40 Id. at 26-27.
41 Id. at 27-29.
42 Id. at 18-2 1.
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A. The Tenth Amendment Theory
The Tenth Amendment reads: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."43 The Lesniak/
iMEGA complaint asserts that, "[r]aising revenue by means of state
laws authorizing Sports Betting is a right reserved to the individual
states" because it is neither a power delegated to the United States nor
denied to the individual states." Therefore, "PASPA violates the Tenth
Amendment by unconstitutionally arrogating to the United States such
express and implied reserved powers to the individual states to regulate
matters affecting its citizens including the raising of revenue . . . ."45
This view existed at the time of the Judiciary Committee hearings
on Senate Bill 474, which later became PASPA, and also found its way
into the committee report in the "Minority Views of [Senator Chuck]
Grassley."4 6 Senator Grassley characterized the bill as "a substantial
intrusion into States' rights [that] would restrict the fundamental right of
States to raise revenue to fund critical State programs." 47 Lotteries and
gaming, Senator Grassley argued, have been "traditionally" state issues,
and in light of the fiscal crises states faced in the early 1990s-as many
states face again in the present day-"Congress should not be telling
the States how they can or cannot raise revenue.""8 Senator Grassley also
cited a letter, later cited by Senator Lesniak in 2009,49 from the Justice
Department to Chairman of the Judiciary Committee Senator Joe Biden
stating concerns over the bill because it presents "federalism issues."s0
In fact, the Lesniak/iMEGA suit is not the first time that the Tenth
Amendment has been invoked in a case attempting to overturn PASPA. In
Flaglerv. U.S. Attorney, a private citizen of NewJersey sued the United States
Attorney for the District of New Jersey and the United States Attorney
General alleging that PASPA was in violation of the Tenth Amendment,
as the power to outlaw sports wagering was not expressly granted to the
federal government.5' The district court dismissed Flagler's complaint
43 U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
44 Complaint and Demand for Declaratory Relief, supra note 39, at 26.
45 Id.
46 S. REP. No. 102-248, at 12 (1992).
47 Id
48 Id.
49 Raymond Lesniak, New Jersey state Senator, Press Conference: Sports Betting: Why
Not in New Jersey? (Mar. 23, 2009), http://blog.nj.com/njv-raymond_1esniak/2oo9/o3/sports-
bettingwhvnotinnew.html.
50 S. REP. No. 102-248, at 13.
51 Complaint at I, Flagler v. U.S. Attorney, No. 2:o6-cv- 3 69 9 -JAG (D.N.J. Aug. 7,
2oo6).
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without reaching the merits, finding that the plaintiff lacked standing
after applying the three-prong test from Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife."
The court's application of the Lujan three-prong test for standing
illustrates the difficulty in challenging PASPA under the Tenth Amendment.
The first requirement for standing is that "'the plaintiff must have suffered
an injury in fact-an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a)
concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical."'"5 Plaintiff Flagler failed this test in the court's estimation
because he "provided [the] [c]ourt with no explanation of how a right to
gamble on professional and amateur sports would be or could be a 'legally
protected interest."'54 The second standing requirement is that "'there must
be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of-
the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant
.... "I" The court concluded that Flagler suffered no injury, rendering
discussion of the causation requirement moot.s6 The third requirement is
that "'it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will
be redressed by a favorable decision."'s7 The court stated that Flagler failed
this prong because even if PASPA is found to be unconstitutional, it does not
necessarily follow that the state legislature will approve wagering on sports.58
The difficulty in demonstrating that one has standing to bring an action
seeking to overturn PASPA may explain why it has been attempted only
twice before, despite the overwhelming concerns of Tenth Amendment
violations since the hearing in 1992. Plaintiffs challenging PASPA in
federal court must be able to establish all three elements, and "when the
plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action or inaction he
challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily 'substantially
more difficult' to establish."59 In the Lesniak/iMEGA complaint, the harm
alleged is experienced by "members [of iMEGA] and private citizens
similarly situated in the [forty-six] remaining states, including New Jersey,
who wish to take advantage of iMEGA members' [wagering] services and/
or Internet Sports Betting or Sports Betting in general."" In light of the
high evidentiary standard for standing outlined in Lujan and applied by
the court in Flagler, it seems that any Tenth Amendment claim may be
predicated on harms too indirect or remote to succeed.
52 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); Flagler v. U.S. Attorney,
No. 06-3699 (JAG), 2007 WL 2814657, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2007).
53 Flagler, 2007 WL 2814657, at *2 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).
54 Id. at *2.
55 Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).
56 Id.
57 Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561).
58 Id. at #3-
59 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992).
60 Complaint and Demand for Declaratory Relief, supra note 39, at 26-27.
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B. The Eleventh Amendment Theory
The Eleventh Amendment states that "[tihe Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.""1 The Lesniak/iMEGA complaint alleges that PASPA violates
the Eleventh Amendment because it "permits the commencement
of a civil action against the State of New Jersey in a Federal Court by
any professional sports organization or amateur sports organization . . .
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §3703" where "[t]he State of New Jersey has not
waived its sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment."
62
However, the fact that New Jersey, or any other state that violates
PASPA, has not waived its sovereign immunity may not matter in deciding
if it is vulnerable to a claim by a sports organization seeking injunctive
relief. The Supreme Court carved out an exception from Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity in Ex parte Young, holding that "suits
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief" may be brought "against state
officers in their individual capacities" when a state acts unconstitutionally.63
The Young exception has since been broadened to include situations
"when the case calls for the interpretation of federal law."' This explains
why the Markell case was brought against Governor Markell and the
Director of the Delaware State Lottery. Therefore, precedent indicates
that any suit for injunctive relief brought by a sports organization under 28
U.S.C. § 3703 will not be barred by Eleventh Amendment state sovereign
immunity because such a suit will call for the interpretation of federal law.
Furthermore, even if sovereign immunity did apply, the suit brought by
Lesniak/iMEGA would suffer from the same handicaps presented by issues
of standing that limit Tenth Amendment claims. None of the plaintiffs are
officers of the state of New Jersey and they do not represent the state in
any official capacity.65 It is likely that any harm suffered by the plaintiffs
would be too indirect, if they can demonstrate they suffered any harm at
all.
61 U.S. CONsT. amend. XI.
62 Complaint and Demand for Declaratory Relief, supra note 39, at 28.
63 Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 52 1 U.S. 261, 269 (1997) (citing Exparte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
64 Id. at 274.
65 SeeExparteYoung, 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908) (holding that an officer acting in an official
capacity can be sued to enjoin the actions of the state as long as the officer has "some connec-
tion with the enforcement of the act"). Mr. Lesniak is not serving in an official capacity as he
is a state senator who legislates rather than enforces the laws.
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C. The "Uniformity Restraint" Theory
The third theory for overturning PASPA on constitutional grounds is
that it violates the Commerce Clause 6 through its discrimination among
the states. Lesniak/iMEGA argued in their complaint that "Congress
is required to legislate uniformly amongst the several states."" This
theory, like the Tenth Amendment theory, was also identified by
Senator Grassley in the Judiciary Committee's report.6 8 Senator Grassley
considered the discriminatory aspect of PASPA to be "[plerhaps even
more troubling" than the states' rights issue and concluded, "[t]here is
simply no rational basis, as a matter of Federal policy, for allowing sports
wagering in three States, while prohibiting it in the other [forty-seven],
nor any rational basis . . . for the purported discrimination between
Nevada, Oregon, and Delaware."6' The stated policy was to not apply
the prohibition retroactively to Oregon and Delaware; however, at the
time of the passage of PASPA, "Delaware [was not] conducting any form
of sports wagering and [had not] done so for the last fifteen (15) years." 7 0
Professor Thomas Colby reviewed the issue of whether Congress is
authorized to discriminate among the states and concluded that "if we
fail to imply a general uniformity constraint on the commerce power,
then we fatally undermine the fundamental constitutional principle
that pervaded the Constitutional Convention, that Congress must not
be permitted to use the commerce power to favor some states at the
expense of others."7 1 He argues that "we should interpret the Constitution
in a manner that preserves this fundamental precept and ensures that it
remains relevant and vital in the twenty-first century and beyond."n
Colby's analysis does not apply to all discriminatory laws; for instance,
laws that are "neutral" on their face but necessarily impose different
burdens because of natural differences among states, such as coal mining
regulation, would not be unconstitutional," neither "would laws that
incorporate differing state standards."" He specifically names PASPA as
a law that violates his proposed principle: "[t]he only federal laws that
would potentially be unconstitutional under the uniformity principle
would be those statutes that-like the Sports Protection Act-regulate
66 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
67 Complaint and Demand for Declaratory Relief, supra note 39.
68 S. REP. No. 102-248, at 13 (1992).
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Thomas B. Colby, Revitalizing the Forgotten Uniformity Constraint on the Commerce Power,
91 VA. L. REV 249. 255 (2005).
7 2 Id.
73 Id. at 255-56.
74 Id. at 256.
173
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
along states lines and treat the same object differently in different states."7
The central tenet of Colby's argument is that uniformity does not require
uniform rules, defined as the law being the same in every state, but does
require uniform treatment, defined as "anti-discrimination" such that "states
(and their people) are all treated equally by the federal government."76 In
the sports wagering context, "a federal law allowing each state to decide for
itself whether it wishes to legalize sports gambling is uniform in the sense
of uniform treatment, but not in the sense of uniform rules."7 This means:
[E]ach state [is afforded] the same opportunity to act (thus uniform
treatment), but the ultimate rules are likely to vary across state lines-sports
betting will probably be legal in some states, and not in others-as some
states will choose to legalize gambling and others will not (thus nonuniform
rules).78
It is worth noting that in the gaming arena Congress had previously allowed
the states a similar opportunity to act with regard to interstate betting on
horse racing. The Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978 included a finding
that "the States should have the primary responsibility for determining
what forms of gambling may legally take place within their borders."" All
Congress would have to do to remedy the unconstitutional discrimination
at issue in PASPA is apply the same finding to another form of wagering.
Ultimately, the rule espoused by Colby is that
Congressional acts enacted pursuant to the commerce power should be
subject to some form of heightened scrutiny if they regulate in geographic
terms, and, in particular, should be viewed with significant skepticism if their
regulatory scope is explicitly drawn along state lines. Unless Congress can
present other compelling, nondiscriminatory justifications for the differential
treatment (and can establish the lack of reasonable, nondiscriminatory
alternatives), these statutes should be upheld only if they were enacted
to solve a localized problem that does not exist elsewhere in the nation,
such that they could have easily been drawn in reasonable nongeographic
terms to achieve the same effect. Reviewing courts should ensure both that
these statutes were not adopted for impermissible purposes (that is, to favor
or disfavor particular states) and that they do not treat similarly situated
persons or objects differently in different states. 0
Colby finds support for this rule in the fact that uniformity in commercial
regulation was a goal sought "passionately" by the participants in the
75 Id.
76 Id. at 264.
77 Id. at 265.
78 Id. at 265-66.
79 15 U.S.C. § 3001 (2oo6).
8o Colby,supra note 71, at 339-40 (footnote omitted).
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Constitutional Convention."' Consequently, the aspirations for uniformity
were manifested in the "combined effect of the Commerce Clause, the
Uniformity Clause, and the Port Preference Clause."" The Framers
found these provisions to be sufficient to preserve uniformity; hence, the
reason uniformity's explicit protection in the Constitution is so limited.
Furthermore, Colby states that "[m]ost scholars agree that the Framers
imagined the commerce power to include only the power to tax and regulate
commercial shipping and navigation between states," activities implicating
only the nation's ports." The Supreme Court espoused this view as late as
1870 in W1ardv. Aaryland. The Court noted that "[i]nequality of burden,
as well as the want of uniformity in commercial regulations, was one of the
grievances of the citizens under the Confederation; and the new Constitution
was adopted, among other things, to remedy those defects in the prior
system."8 4 The three aforementioned clauses of the Constitution, when
taken together, "show[] that Congress, as well as the States, is forbidden to
make any discrimination in enacting commercial or revenue regulations.""
Applying Colby's rule, PASPA would undoubtedly fail a heightened
uniformity test. The activity that PASPA regulates, state-sanctioned sports
wagering, would qualify as a commercial activity, as well as one that raises
revenue. The regulatory scope is effectively drawn along state lines, as
Nevada, Delaware, Oregon, and Montana are the only states that qualify
for exemption from its provisions.86 The reasons for the discrimination
are not compelling, as PASPA was premised on whether any such scheme
had existed in the state in the past, regardless of whether it was in place
at the time of the passage of the law." At the time of the Act's passage,
states like Delaware were no different than states with no wagering
scheme; Delaware had willingly moved in the direction that PASPA forced
all states to move." The discrimination in its favor allowed Delaware to
resurrect state-sponsored sports wagering, which it had abandoned some
81 Id. at 272.
82 Id. at 283. The Commerce Clause states that Congress shall have the power to "reg-
ulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes." U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. The Uniformity Clause states that "all Duties, Imposts
and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. i.
The Port Preference Clause states that "[n]o Preference shall be given by any Regulation of
Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound
to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another." U.S. CONsr. art. I,
§ 9, cl. 6.
83 Colby, supra note 71, at 283.
84 Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. 418, 431 (1870).
85 Id.
86 28 U.S.C. § 3704.
87 Id.
88 See Office of the Comm'r of Baseball v. Mkarkell, 579 E3d 293, 303 (3d Cir. 2009).
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thirty years earlier. 9 The discrimination in Delaware's favor is contrary
to the very purposes of the law. The question remains, however, whether
this heightened scrutiny would be applied by a court reviewing PASPA.
Colby characterizes the position of the courts on uniformity in the
present day to be a "180-degree reversal" from its stance in the time
of Ward v. Maryland.90 Indeed, the Supreme Court has concluded that
"'there is no requirement of uniformity in connection with the commerce
power."'91 This evolution in the case law can be traced back to a statement
in James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railway. The Supreme
Court noted that the plaintiff sought "to engraft upon the Constitution
a restriction not found in it; that is, that the power to regulate conferred
upon Congress obtains subject to the requirement that regulations enacted
shall be uniform throughout the United States."" Colby argues that this
statement was referring only to the concept of uniform rules, not uniform
treatment, but concedes that it has come to be interpreted as rejecting both
uniform rules and treatment, and this idea has "taken root."" This is the
context in which PASPA was passed and in which it still exists. As a result,
at the time of consideration for the bill that would become PASPA, it could
safely be said that "federal courts addressing the issue of whether federal
anti-gambling legislation may vary in its application have consistently held
that the regulation of gambling is within the Federal Commerce Clause
power and, as such, Congress is not required to enact uniform legislation."'
Thus, the proponents of PASPA were able to feel assured that its opponents
"who have asserted that the proposed bill discriminates between the
states have no legitimate constitutional basis for this contention."'"
Therefore, it is likely that a challenge to PASPA on grounds that it
unconstitutionally discriminates among states will be rejected by the
courts. Though concerns over the Act's discriminatory aspects were voiced
at the time of its consideration and the Act has been identified by scholars
as a particular example of the kind of discrimination the Constitution was
created to prevent, the fact remains that the twentieth century witnessed
stark changes in how the courts perceived any uniformity requirement
present in the Constitution. Though the Supreme Court moved in the
direction of restricting Congress' power under the Commerce Clause in the
mid-1990s, 6 it has not made any indications that uniformity will re-emerge
89 Id.
90 Colby, supra note 71, at 288-289.
91 Id. (quoting Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. I, 14 (1939)).
92 Id. at 298 (quoting James Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry., 242 U.S. 311, 327
(1917)).
93 Id. at 299, 301.
94 Bradley, supra note 19, at 17-18.
95 Id. at 18.
96 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565-68 (1995).
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as an effective restraint on the legislature.As a result, though the third theory
with which to challenge PASPA is the most compelling in terms of historical
support, it does not hold much promise given the current judicial climate.
III. WHY SPORTS WAGERING: LOOKING AT COMPETING
POLICY CONCERNS
Considering the above analysis, if overturning PASPA is such a difficult
and potentially fruitless endeavor, should the effort be made at all? An
answer to this question can be found through balancing the competing
policy interests found on both sides of the issue. Despite the frequent
iterations by proponents of PASPA that "[t]he disadvantages of legal sports
gambling far outweigh the advantages,"97 it is in reality the disadvantages
of illegal sports wagering that cause most of the problems Congress and
other supporters of the law seek to control. Legal sports wagering, while
sought primarily by states seeking to alleviate economic hardship, in fact
serves the very purposes of PASPA: protecting the integrity of sports from
gambling money influencing the outcome of matches and preventing
underage gambling. Additionally, in an era in which internet gaming has
become an area of concern for many states, legalized sports wagering gives
states the opportunity to present a legal alternative to internet wagering-an
alternative thatwould keep money otherwise wagered online within the state.
Beyond the nebulous goal of "maintain[ing] the integrity of our national
pastime," 98 the prohibitions against sports wagering were implemented to
remedy two specific problems. The first of these problems is the perception
that legal sports betting will lead to a higher incidence of game-fixing or
point-shaving. In the words of the Judiciary Committee report, if sports
wagering was legalized, sports would "come to represent the fast buck,
the quick fix, the desire to get something for nothing. . . . Widespread
legalization of sports gambling would inevitably promote suspicion about
controversial plays and lead fans to think 'the fix was in' whenever their
team failed to beat the point-spread."' College athletes, in particular, are
seen as potential victims of gamblers' influence and sports wagering is seen
as "jeopardizing the integrity of collegiate sporting events."'00
The fact is, however, that legal bookmakers have an economic interest
in fair results in sporting contests and have proven to be effective in help-
ing root out corruption when it has occurred. One example is the Arizona
State University point-shaving scandal of 1993-1994, in which members
of the men's basketball team collaborated with organized crime figures
97 Bradley, supra note 19, at 18.
98 S. REP. No. 102-248, at 4 (1992).
99 Id. at 4-5.
oo Slavin,supra note 34, at 723.
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and purposefully missed free throws to avoid covering the point spread."o'
Nevada bookmakers "discovered that the betting pattern on Arizona State
games changed tremendously, [and] they alerted the FBI."'02 In addition,
when the casinos noticed that "$250,000 in bets caused the line to drop
to three points," for a game between Arizona State and the University of
Washington, they "suspended betting on the game." 03
In countries where sports wagering and online bookmaking are le-
gal, news of recent scandals provide examples of the effectiveness of le-
gal bookmakers in detecting and reporting corruption in sporting events.
Consider, for instance, the recent spate of allegations of match-fixing in
professional tennis. When professional tennis player Nikolay Davydenko
was suspected of throwing a tennis match he was favored to win in 2007,
it was the British online sports book Betfair that "brought the scandal to
light" and "refused to pay $7 million of bets on Davydenko."'" Betfair's
"security team had recognized irregular betting patterns" during the match
and "turned over all of its data to the" Association of Tennis Professionals
after the match ended.'o Similarly, in a 2010 professional tennis tourna-
ment in Brisbane, Australia, "Australian bookmakers reported a suspicious
amount of money" coming in on a particular match to authorities.0 6 Be-
yond recent tennis scandals, since its founding in 2000, Betfair "has alerted
dozens of sports about suspicious betting activity, leading to investigations
in horse racing [and] soccer . . . ."' The company "has agreements with
32 sports governing bodies and is seeking more, promising to share in real
time any unusual betting activity." 0s American sports, by contrast, see
"more money . .. bet illegally and without regulation."'" Wharton School
of Business professor Justin Wolfers argues that in American sports "'[t]
here is a greater potential for corruption . . . . Bad guys are going to get
away with more stuff unless we channel it into a legitimate economy."'
1 10
The second major concern PASPA was enacted to address was the
growth of compulsive gambling among teenagers. Senator Bill Bradley,
writing in defense of the bill, stated affirmatively that "state sponsored
ol Id at 73 1.
102 Id. at 732.
103 Id.
104 Joe Drape, Gambling on Matches Makes Tennis Tours Uneasy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2010,
at B iI.
105 Joe Drape, Web Site Puts Focus on Fix in Sports Bets, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2oo8, at Ai.
After an investigation, the ATP cleared Davydenko of any incidence of match-fixing in 2007.
Drape, supra note 104.
i o6 Drape, supra note 104.
107 Drape, supra note 105.
io8 Id.
1o9 Id.
iio Id.
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sports lotteries would exacerbate the problem of teenage gambling."11' In
1999, the National Gambling Impact Study Commission echoed this be-
lief, recommending further restrictions on sports wagering because it "can
put adolescent gamblers at risk for gambling problems.""2 While concerns
about the proliferation of underage gamblers are entirely justified, propo-
nents of PASPA fail to recognize that these concerns could be adequately
addressed through a legitimate market. Sports wagering exists in the Unit-
ed States whether it is legal or illegal. What legal sports wagering offers
that illegal sports wagering does not is the potential for strict oversight.
Specifically, legal sports wagering schemes provide the ability to exercise
control over who is allowed to access wagering facilities and place bets.
The problem of underage gaming can easily be solved by careful place-
ment of sports books in venues like casinos or off-track betting parlors that
already have age restrictions and have histories of enforcing the minimum
age requirement."3 Senator Bradley seemed dismissive of this argument
when he said that "sports betting would teach young people how to gamble.
This, in turn, would lead these children to illegal gambling once they dis-
cover that the odds and pay-offs are better.""4 This line of thinking ignores
the fact that legalized sports wagering, with increased oversight and regu-
lation, could curtail illegal wagering altogether. This phenomenon would
not be unprecedented. The creation and spread of state lotteries "virt-
ally eliminated" another once-prevalent form of illegal wagering, the num-
bers game."' If enough adult bettors engage in legal wagering and cause
the illegal bookmakers to dry up, as lotteries did to the numbers racket,
the opportunities for teenagers to gamble illegally will also be eliminated.
This final point requires additional discussion. Wagering on sports takes
place among the American people, regardless of its legality-"Americans
want to wager on sporting events, but are limited in how they may do
this legally.""' As Washington Post horse racing columnist Andrew Bever
wrote, "[njot since Prohibition have Americans so readily engaged in an
illegal activity as they do with sports betting today. The most upright cit-
izens don't hesitate to telephone a bookmaker-even though they may
suspect or know that the bookie has ties to organized crime.""' Bever
reported figures that "estimate[d] that illegal sports betting is a $40-bil-
Iii Bradley, supra note 19, at 7.
i12 Slavin, supra note 34, at 736.
113 See Levinson, supra note 8, at 162 (noting New Jersey's enforcement of casino age
restrictions would carry over into sports books, should they become legal).
I14 Bradley, supra note 19, at 7.
1 15 Andrew Beyer, Betting Bill: File It Under Inexplicable, WAsH. Posr, Nov. 16. 1991, at
G9 .
I16 Levinson, supra note 8, at 144.
i7 Bever, supra note 1 15.
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lion-a-year industry-and one that is growing steadily.""' The prohibi-
tion against sports wagering has done little to eliminate illegal gambling
or cure its negative effects. All that the prohibition against sports wager-
ing can be said to have actually accomplished is encapsulated in the fact
that because "sports wagering is illegal in most states, it does not provide
many of the positive impacts that other forms of gambling provide.""'
The possible economic incentives that have driven the reemergence
of the debate on PASPA are not to be taken lightly. Consider the impact
of legal sports wagering in Nevada, the only state allowed to fully benefit
from sports wagering revenue under the current law. On Super Bowl week-
end alone, "250,000 people visit Las Vegas, [and] the hotel occupancy rate
is essentially 100%."120 The sports wagering industry generates jobs, "not
only those in the race and sports books," but also "throughout each of the
hotel-casino-resort complexes to maids, valet parking attendants, food and
beverage servers, and casino floor personnel. These jobs, along with feder-
al, state, and local tax levies, help generate billions of dollars in government
revenues.""' In the modern economic climate, "it would seem inescapably
logical for cash-strapped state governments to legalize sports betting and
let the revenue from it flow to legitimate purposes instead of criminals."122
This line of thinking has driven New Jersey State Senator Lesniak to
seek a judicial overturning of PASPA in an effort to bring sports wagering
to his state. Sports wagering would offer New Jersey, a state with budget-
ary concerns and a gaming industry struggling to remain competitive, four
positive impacts:
First, it would increase direct revenue for the State . . . . Second, sports
wagering would expand indirect revenue due to increases in taxes from
travel and tourism related industries. Third, sports wagering would draw
more visitors to the Atlantic City region .... Finally, New Jersey would be
able to fend off the growing online gaming industry.23
Additionally, Lesniak and the horsemen's groups who joined his lawsuit
with iMEGA see sports betting as a viable option to be a "savior for the [New
Jersey] horse racing industry," which is currently dependent on state subsi-
dies for its survival.124 In Lesniak's opinion, wagering on sports and wagering
on horse racing both constitute wagering on athletic events, making them
a much better fit for one another than casino-style gaming at racetracks.12 1
II8 Id.
i19 Slavin, supra note 34, at 725.
120 Id. at 741.
121 Id.
122 Beyer,supra note 115.
123 Levinson, supra note 8, at 151.
124 Lesniak, supra note 49.
125 Id.
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It is worth emphasizing that the overturning of PASPA would not only
benefit New Jersey. It could potentially benefit any state seeking a new
source of necessary revenue. A prime example is Kentucky. Like New Jer-
sey, Kentucky is facing a budget shortfall, in the amount of $1.5 billion.'2 1
Kentucky has also considered expanding gaming,"' and it is at least plau-
sible that it loses revenue to casinos and gaming establishments strategi-
cally located in neighboring states.' 1 Furthermore, expanded gaming has
been viewed in Kentucky as a way to "boost the state's horse industry,"
which is vital to the state's economy and identity.121 Finally, Kentucky is a
state that has also attempted to curtail citizens' online gaming in an effort
to protect the horse industry, even going so far as to have Governor Steve
Beshear "attempt to seize 141 gambling domain names" before the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals ruled that such action was beyond his authority.5 o
The need for an expansion of gaming to protect Kentucky's horse in-
dustry should not be understated. While most people associate Kentucky
with its horse industry, the amount of money generated by the equine sec-
tor in Kentucky has declined by hundreds of millions of dollars.' 3 ' Money
derived from expanded gaming could be used to bolster the amount of
purse money available in races and attract more competitors, a scheme im-
plemented by states like Indiana and West Virginia that have successfully
cut into Kentucky's market share of the horse racing and breeding indus-
try. 1 However, at this point, expansion of gaming to include casinos and
racetrack slots would only bring Kentucky to the status quo. Sports wager-
ing not only would give Kentucky a unique opportunity to recoup some of
I 26 Stephenie Steitzer, Sales 7x Seen as Way to Balance Ky. Budget: Legislative Leaders
Doubt There's 7imeto Draft Bill, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Jan. 23, 2olo, at Ai.
I 27 Increasing Number of States are Considering Initiatives, USA TODAY, June 25, 199], at
C8. Noting that Kentucky attempted to implement a sports lottery in 1989 but the scheme
was contested by the Kentucky Thoroughbred Association and eventually the governor asked
the lottery board to shelve the plan. With the current Governor and the Kentucky horsemen's
groups now solid backers of expanded gaming to aid the horse industry, one wvonders if the
result would be different today.
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its losses, but also would establish a market share in a new form of wagering
which complements its racing industry better than slots or casino games.
Kentucky and New Jersey face the same budget issues and threats
to their respective horse industries and seek the same goals from ex-
panded gaming in their states. New Jersey has determined that sports
wagering might be in its best interest and is pushing to let citizens de-
cide the issue through a referendum vote. 3 Kentucky might find it-
self able to draw the same conclusion, especially in light of the chance
of expanded gaming at Kentucky racetracks becoming more remote.134
In summation, there are compelling reasons behind the efforts to overturn
PASPA and create opportunities for legal, state-sponsored sports wagering
schemes despite the longodds againstsuccess. Contrarytowhat proponents of
the law have said, the benefits of legal sports wagering outweigh its costs.The
aims that PASPA was meant to accomplish could be better achieved through
legal sports wagering with strict oversight than by the terms of the law itself.
CONCLusioN
Congress enacted PASPA at the behest of the major American sports
organizations in 1992 in order to protect the integrity of professional and
amateur sports.3 5 The effects of the law, however, have manifested them-
selves in ways different than Congress intended. PASPA, through discrimi-
nation among the states, has created a de facto monopoly on legal sports
wagering in Nevada allowing the state to enjoy revenue opportunities
denied to the rest of the country. For this reason, the law is being chal-
lenged in federal court based on alleged violations of the Tenth and Elev-
enth Amendments and abuse of power under the Commerce Clause.
Due to precedent, however, these claims will most likely fail. The cru-
cial questions that need to be asked are how much sense does this make,
and does the rationale behind PASPA actually justify denying this source of
revenue to the states? The obvious answers are no. Besides the important
economic benefits being withheld from states in need, the fact also remains
that the dangers of legal sports wagering have been drastically overstated.
In addition, legal sports wagering actually has the opportunity to create the
very salutary effects PASPA's supporters desired. While the law seems set-
tled and the chances of overturning it slim, it is necessary to question the
133 Mark Eckel, Sports Betting Can Save Atlantic City, NJ.CoM: (AUGUST 9, 201o, 9:19 AM),
http://wwwnj.com/mercer/index.ssf/2oio/o8/eckel-sports-betting-can-save.html.
134 Gerth, supra note 129.
135 Levinson, supra note 8, at 176. It is worth asking where scandals involving perfor-
mance-enhancing drugs, criminal behavior, and other lascivious or at least morally question-
able behavior by professional and amateur athletes fit into a discussion about protecting the
"integrity" of sports. See id. at 176-77. Such a question, however, is too far outside the purview
of this Note for discussion and this Note takes no position on the answer.
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wisdom behind current federal gaming policy. That policy is aimed towards
serving a very abstract purpose-protecting the "integrity" of sports-that
denies the states desperately-needed revenue and stimulus for industries
within their borders. If the courts are unable or unwilling to change the
status quo, now may be the time to revisit the question in the legislature
with recognition that the conventional wisdom on legal sports betting is
incorrect.

